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In the early summer of 2015, Marisol and her seven-year-old
daughter Jennifer fled Honduras after a gang visited her home
the second time. The first time they came, they took away her
sixteen-year-old son, Jaime. She never saw Jaime alive again—
his body was discovered in a ravine just outside of town three
days later. Marisol believes Jaime was killed because he refused
to join the gang. The second time the gang came to Marisol’s
home was to demand that she begin to pay “la renta”—an
extortionary
demand
for
payment—in
exchange
for
“guaranteeing” her safety. Marisol did not consider contacting
the local police because she knew that the endemic corruption
among Honduran law enforcement officials meant that she would
either have to pay a bribe to have the police investigate her
claims, or worse, the police would report to the gang that she had
attempted to prosecute them and there would surely be
retribution for her “treachery.” Marisol faced a life-changing
decision: try to keep up with payments to the gang with her
paltry earnings from caring for her neighbors’ children or flee
Honduras for the safety of the United States where her
naturalized United States citizen sister resided. Seeking a
†
Clinical Teaching Fellow and Supervising Attorney, Immigration & Human
Rights Clinic, The University of the District of Columbia David A. Clarke School of
Law; J.D. The University of the District of Columbia David A. Clarke School of Law;
M.Ph. Columbia University in the City of New York; M.A. Columbia University in
the City of New York; B.A. Oberlin College. The author would like to thank Richard
Boswell, Muneer Ahmed, Kate Evans, Sabi Ardalan, and Jason Cade for valuable
comments and suggestions at the New York University School of Law Clinical Law
Review 2015 Writers’ Workshop; Laurie Morin, Matt Fraidin, and Andrew Ferguson
at the University of the District of Columbia David A. Clarke School of Law; and
especially Kristina Campbell at the University of the District of Columbia David A.
Clarke School of Law for her mentorship and example.

915

916

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90:915

better-paying job in order to earn enough to pay la renta seemed
unlikely since Marisol, with only a fourth-grade education, was
functionally illiterate. Besides, there would be no one to care for
Jennifer since Marisol’s husband had abandoned the family two
years earlier. Convinced that remaining in Honduras would
result in her certain death at the hands of the gang, Marisol
chose to travel the dangerous route northward to freedom from
persecution.
Three weeks later, Marisol crossed the United States border
and turned herself into a U.S. Customs and Border Patrol officer.
Marisol told the officer of her fear of death if she was returned to
Honduras. After a brief stay in the “icebox,” an interim holding
facility with frigid temperatures designed to maximize the
discomfort of noncitizens entering the country without
documentation, Marisol and Jennifer were transferred to the
family detention center in Karnes, Texas.
While incarcerated, Marisol was interviewed by an asylum
officer and found to have a credible fear of persecution if she and
her daughter were returned to Honduras. The asylum officer
referred Marisol’s case to an immigration judge in San Antonio
for a full hearing of her claim. Yet, despite having established a
prima facie case for her asylum claim, when Marisol appeared
unrepresented in court for her bond hearing, the judge set her
bond at $15,000—an impossibly high amount for a woman of
such modest means. Marisol and Jennifer remained incarcerated
until a local nonprofit agency put her in touch with a team of pro
bono attorneys who succeeded in having Marisol’s bond lowered
to $3,000. Marisol’s sister and her husband immediately paid the
bond and secured her release from custodial detention. Marisol
was relatively fortunate—her stay at the Karnes facility was only
ninety days, whereas other women she met there had been
detained for over a year simply because they could not find a
lawyer to help them.
Even though Marisol was no longer incarcerated, her
travails were far from over. Her pro bono attorneys had made
clear that their representation was for the limited purpose of
securing her release on bond; after all, there were hundreds of
women and children at Karnes who required immediate legal
assistance to get out on bond. Marisol would now have to find an
attorney who would agree to represent her at no—or low—cost.
The stakes could not be higher: if Marisol was not successful at
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her hearing before the immigration judge, she faced certain
persecution upon her forced return to Honduras. Despite all
odds, Marisol began to contact nonprofit agencies, law school
clinics, and other potential sources of representation because she
knew that successfully navigating the notoriously complicated
shoals of immigration law without an attorney was a nearly
insurmountable task.
INTRODUCTION
Despite the harsh nature of removal, the per se right of
indigent defendants to appointed counsel generally does not
extend to immigration proceedings. Relatively recent case law
establishing the categorical right to appointed counsel for
mentally disabled immigrants in removal proceedings represents
the singular foothold of civil Gideon in the immigration realm.1
Notably, the basis for the favorable order in Franco-Gonzalez v.
Holder was rooted in the finding that § 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act required the appointment of counsel as a “reasonable
accommodation.”2 By explicitly predicating its reasoning on the
plaintiffs’ disability claims, the court did not address the
plaintiffs’ constitutional claims, thereby “avoid[ing] reaching
constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of deciding
them.”3
This Article argues that had the Franco-Gonzalez court
evaluated the plaintiffs’ constitutional claims by applying the
classic Mathews v. Eldridge4 due process balancing test
supplemented by more recent United States Supreme Court
jurisprudence, the Franco-Gonzalez court would have arrived at
an identical conclusion regarding the categorical right to
appointed counsel for individuals with mental disabilities. This
Article further argues that the legal rationales for the putative
successful constitutional claim in Franco-Gonzalez can be used to
extend civil Gideon to other classes of vulnerable immigrant
groups in removal proceedings, including detained noncitizen
women and children like Marisol and Jennifer.

1
Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, No. CV 10-02211 DMG (DTBx), 2013 WL 3674492,
at *20 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2013).
2
Id. at *3.
3
Id. at *9 (quoting In re Joye, 578 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2009)).
4
424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976).
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The scholarship to date that has highlighted the need for
appointed counsel in immigration proceedings has generally not
applied classic due process analysis in light of the additional
conditions cited in Turner v. Rogers5—the Supreme Court’s most
recent statement on the appropriate factors to be considered in a
due process analysis.6 This Article elaborates on the analysis of
those scholars who have argued that Turner provides a
promising path for appointed counsel in removal proceedings by
re-examining the landmark case Franco-Gonzalez in light of
Turner and extending the analysis to other vulnerable groups.7
Part I outlines the current statutory and constitutional
contours of appointed counsel in immigration proceedings. Part
II applies the classic Mathews due process balancing test and the
additional factors cited in Turner to demonstrate that the
Franco-Gonzalez plaintiffs’ due process claims also merited the
right to appointed counsel. Part II also addresses several of the
arguments opposing the appointment of counsel, specifically the
presumed prohibitive cost of providing counsel and the
potentially dilatory effect on the administration of justice. Part
III uses the same analytical framework to argue that a
categorical right to appointed counsel exists for other vulnerable
groups, including detained families.

5

564 U.S. 431, 444–45 (2011).
See generally Kevin R. Johnson, An Immigration Gideon for Lawful Permanent
Residents, 122 YALE L.J. 2394 (2013); Soulmaz Taghavi, Montes-Lopez v. Holder:
Applying Eldridge To Ensure a Per Se Right to Counsel for Indigent Immigrants in
Removal Proceedings, 39 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 245 (2014); Nimrod Pitsker,
Comment, Due Process for All: Applying Eldridge To Require Appointed Counsel for
Asylum Seekers, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 169 (2007).
7
See Mark Noferi, Cascading Constitutional Deprivation: The Right to
Appointed Counsel for Mandatorily Detained Immigrants Pending Removal
Proceedings, 18 MICH. J. RACE & L. 63, 113 (2012); Daniel Curry, Note, The March
Toward Justice: Assessing the Impact of Turner v. Rogers on Civil Access-to-Justice
Reforms, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 487 (2012); Shane T. Devins, Comment, Using
the Language of Turner v. Rogers To Advocate for a Right to Counsel in Immigration
Removal Proceedings, 46 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 893 (2013); Miguel A. Gradilla, Note,
Making Rights Real: Effectuating the Due Process Rights of Particularly Vulnerable
Immigrants in Removal Proceedings Through Administrative Mechanisms, 4 COLUM.
J. RACE & L. 225 (2014).
6
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STATUTORY & CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS FOR
APPOINTED COUNSEL

An examination of the statutory and constitutional bases for
the right to appointed counsel in immigration proceedings yields
starkly different conclusions. While there is little statutory basis
for the right to an appointed attorney, a review of the evolution of
claims grounded in constitutional arguments provides more
promising results.
A.

Statutory Rights

With a limited exception, there exists no categorical right to
government-funded representation in removal proceedings.
Section 292 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”),
codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1362, establishes the statutory basis for an
alien’s right to counsel:
In any removal proceedings before an immigration judge and in
any appeal proceedings before the Attorney General from any
such removal proceedings, the person concerned shall have the
privilege of being represented (at no expense to the
Government) by such counsel, authorized to practice in such
proceedings, as he shall choose.8

While § 292 refers to the “privilege” of appointed counsel, it has
been observed that “its title, legislative history, and regulations
make clear that the INA in fact establishes a right.”9 This
statutory right is clearly limited by the parenthetical language
“(at no expense to the Government)”. This limitation has been
interpreted to mean that the government is not required to pay
for legal representation in removal proceedings.10 Thus, while it

8

8 U.S.C. § 1362 (2012).
Michael Kaufman, Note, Detention, Due Process, and the Right to Counsel in
Removal Proceedings, 4 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & CIV. LIBERTIES 113, 124 (2008)
(footnotes omitted); see also Castro-O’Ryan v. U.S. Dep’t of Immigr. &
Naturalization, 847 F.2d 1307, 1312 (9th Cir. 1987).
10
El Rescate Legal Servs., Inc. v. Exec. Off. of Immigr. Rev., 959 F.2d 742, 749
(9th Cir. 1991) (observing congressional intent not to pay for the alien’s
representation); Escobar Ruiz v. INS, 813 F.2d 283, 285 (9th Cir. 1987) (concluding
that “the parenthetical in [§] 292 means only that the government has no obligation
to appoint and pay for the representation of aliens in deportation proceedings”),
overruled on other grounds by Rueda-Menicucci v. INS, 132 F.3d 493 (9th Cir. 1997).
9
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is generally accepted that a statutory right to counsel at the
alien’s expense exists under § 292, no categorical right exists to
counsel at the government’s expense.11
Additional statutes describe heightened safeguards for the
vulnerable populations of unaccompanied minor children and
“mental incompetents” facing removal. Yet, although these
statutory provisions prescribe additional duties of the
immigration judge to ensure a fair proceeding, they fall short of
authorizing government-paid counsel. For example, the William
Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of
2008
(“TVPRA”)
specifies
additional
safeguards
for
unaccompanied children that include specialized procedures
relating to their screening at ports of entry, applications for
political asylum, and their care and custody while under the
supervision of the Office of Refugee Resettlement.12 However,
with respect to their right to government-funded counsel, the
TVPRA explicitly references the limiting language of § 292.13
Similarly, for aliens who have been deemed mentally
incompetent—like the Franco-Gonzalez plaintiffs—federal
regulations provide for heightened procedural safeguards
including, among other things, special rules regarding: (1) service
of the Notice to Appear;14 (2) parties qualified to appear on the
alien’s behalf;15 and (3) the immigration judge’s acceptance of an
admission of removability.16 Notwithstanding these heightened
procedural safeguards, none of the statutory provisions establish
a categorical right to government-funded counsel for mentally
incompetent aliens.

11
That is not to say that the government is prohibited from paying for counsel.
In Franco-Gonzalez, the Department of Justice unsuccessfully argued that the
limiting language served as a bar to the use of federal funding. The court rejected
the DOJ’s pinched construction and held that “the plain language of [§ 292] does not
lend itself to the interpretation that it ‘prohibits the provision of counsel at
government expense.’ ” Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, No. CV 10-02211 DMG (DTBx),
2013 WL 3674492, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2013).
12
See William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044 (2008); see also 6 U.S.C. § 279 (2012);
8 U.S.C.A. § 1232(b)(1) (West 2014).
13
§ 1232(c)(5).
14
8 C.F.R. § 236.2(a) (2016).
15
Id. § 1240.4.
16
Id. § 1240.10(c).
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In fact, the only section of the INA that unequivocally
establishes an alien’s per se right to counsel at government
expense is INA § 504(c), which is limited to the removal of aliens
appearing before the United States Alien Terrorist Removal
Court (“ATRC”). Section 504(c) provides:
The alien shall have a right to be present at such hearing and to
be represented by counsel. Any alien financially unable to
obtain counsel shall be entitled to have counsel assigned to
represent the alien. Such counsel shall be appointed by the
judge pursuant to the plan for furnishing representation for any
person financially unable to obtain adequate representation for
the district in which the hearing is conducted . . . .17

Notably, counsel has never been appointed at government
expense under § 504(c) since the ATRC is not yet used.18 At least
one author has argued that the ATRC has never met because the
court’s reliance on secret evidence would be unlikely to survive
constitutional scrutiny.19
B.

Constitutional Claims

In contrast to the absence of a statutory basis for appointed
counsel in removal proceedings, a claim rooted in constitutional
arguments yields more promising results.
The constitutional right to appointed counsel at government
expense can arise under the Fifth or Sixth Amendments.
However, citizens and noncitizens are not similarly situated in
this context. The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”20 In Gideon v.
Wainwright, the United States Supreme Court interpreted this
language to encompass the appointment of counsel for indigent
defendants in criminal prosecutions.21 At his trial for a felony
charge of breaking and entering, Clarence Gideon requested and
was denied appointed counsel.22 He was subsequently convicted

17

8 U.S.C. § 1534(c)(1) (2012).
Stephen I. Vladeck, Standing and Secret Surveillance, 10 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y
FOR INFO. SOC’Y 551, 578 n.123 (2014).
19
John Dorsett Niles, Note, Assessing the Constitutionality of the Alien Terrorist
Removal Court, 57 DUKE L.J. 1833, 1836–37 (2008).
20
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
21
372 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1963).
22
Id. at 336–37.
18
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and sentenced to five years in the state prison.23 On appeal, the
Court observed the “obvious truth” that “in our adversary system
of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to
hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is
provided for him.”24
The precise contours of the Gideon Court’s seemingly
expansive holding were subsequently established in Argersinger
v. Hamlin25 and Scott v. Illinois.26 In Argersinger, the Court
broadened the right to appointed counsel to encompass nonfelony
prosecutions based on the reasoning that many of the protections
afforded by the Sixth Amendment are not categorically limited by
the felony/misdemeanor dichotomy.27 Seven years later in Scott,
the Court identified the outer limit of the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel by holding that the appointment of counsel was only
required in cases that could result in actual incarceration.28
Importantly for the purposes of this Article, the right to
appointed counsel under the Sixth Amendment post-Scott is
available to citizens and noncitizens alike in criminal
prosecutions involving potential incarceration.
Yet, notwithstanding the promise of Gideon, the Sixth
Amendment is an infelicitous vehicle for providing noncitizens
with appointed counsel in immigration court.
It is well
established that a noncitizen has no right to appointed counsel in
removal proceedings under the Sixth Amendment. This result
flows from the view that a removal proceeding “is a purely civil
action to determine eligibility to remain in this country.”29 But
predicating the eligibility for appointment of counsel on the
classification of the proceedings as either civil or criminal ignores
the collateral consequences of a conviction. In his concurrence to
23

Id. at 337.
Id. at 344.
25
407 U.S. 25 (1972).
26
440 U.S. 367 (1979).
27
Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 28. One obvious exception here is the right to trial by
jury. In this context, the Court differentiated the “different genealogy” of the right to
trial by jury. Id. at 29.
28
Scott, 440 U.S. at 373–74.
29
INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984); see also Negusie v.
Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 526 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“This Court has long
understood that an ‘order of deportation is not a punishment for crime.’ ” (quoting
Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893))); Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S.
32, 39 (1924) (“It is well settled that deportation, while it may be burdensome and
severe for the alien, is not a punishment.” (citing Font Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 730)).
24
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Argersinger, Justice Powell presciently argued for a broader rule,
noting that “[s]erious consequences also may result from
convictions not punishable by imprisonment.”30 It was precisely
this logic that provided the foundation for the Court’s opinion
twenty-nine years later in Padilla v. Kentucky.31 Nonetheless,
the current rule of law holds that noncitizens facing removal are
“not at all similarly situated to a defendant in a federal criminal
prosecution” and, therefore, fail to qualify for counsel at the
Government’s expense.32
In contrast, it has been settled that noncitizens have due
process protections under the Fifth Amendment.33 The modern
roots of this entitlement can be traced to the Supreme Court’s
1903 opinion in Yamataya v. Fisher in which the Court stated
that due process inhered in removal proceedings.34 In Ng Fung
Ho v. White, Justice Brandeis underscored the importance of the
liberty interest at stake in removal proceedings by
acknowledging the drastic nature of removal and the potential
for the loss “of all that makes life worth living.”35 Similarly, the
Court recognized in Bridges v. Wixon that although removal is
not a criminal proceeding, due process attached because the
hardship that was likely to be visited on the noncitizen was
“often as great if not greater than the imposition of a criminal
sentence.”36
Within this line of Supreme Court cases, it is critical to
differentiate between noncitizens already present in the country,
who are subject to removal proceedings, and those noncitizens
seeking entry who are subject to exclusion.
The Chinese
Exclusion Case established that as far as noncitizens outside the

30

Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 48 (Powell, J., concurring).
559 U.S. 356 (2010); see John D. King, Beyond “Life and Liberty”: The
Evolving Right to Counsel, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 3 (2013); see infra notes
142–143 and accompanying text.
32
Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1690–91 (2013).
33
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (recognizing that the “Due
Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens,
whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent”).
34
189 U.S. 86, 100 (1903) (“[T]his court has never held, nor must we now be
understood as holding, that administrative officers, when executing the provisions of
a statute involving the liberty of persons, may disregard the fundamental principles
that inhere in ‘due process of law’ as understood at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution.”).
35
259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922).
36
326 U.S. 135, 164 (1945).
31
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country are concerned, Congress has an absolute right to
exclude.37 Perhaps the bluntest statement regarding Congress’s
plenary power with respect to noncitizens seeking entry was
provided by Justice Minton: “Whatever the procedure authorized
by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is
concerned.”38
However, for noncitizens already physically present inside
the United States, due process jurisprudence requires heightened
procedural safeguards.39 The leading case examining the right to
government-appointed counsel for physically present noncitizens
in removal proceedings is Aguilera-Enriquez v. INS.40 Here, the
court reviewed an immigration judge’s decision to order
petitioner Aguilera-Enriquez, a lawful permanent resident,
deported on the basis of a drug conviction.41 The issue raised on
appeal was whether the indigent alien had the constitutional
right to appointed counsel in his removal proceeding. Drawing
on the “fundamental fairness” due process test articulated in
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit held that “[t]he test for whether due process
requires the appointment of counsel for an indigent alien is
whether, in a given case, the assistance of counsel would be
necessary to provide ‘fundamental fairness the touchstone of due
Thus, while the court failed to recognize a
process.’ ”42
categorical right to appointed counsel, it did instruct that
appointment of counsel may be necessary where “an
unrepresented indigent alien would require counsel to present
his position adequately to an immigration judge.”43 AguileraEnriquez’s appeal was ultimately unsuccessful because he failed
to provide a substantive defense to the predicate drug charge for
which he was deportable.44
37

Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889).
United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950).
39
Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953) (“It is
true that aliens who have once passed through our gates, even illegally, may be
expelled only after proceedings conforming to traditional standards of fairness
encompassed in due process of law.”).
40
516 F.2d 565, 568–70 (6th Cir. 1975).
41
Id. at 567.
42
Id. at 568 (quoting Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973)).
43
Id. at 568 n.3.
44
Id. at 569 (“The lack of counsel before the Immigration Judge did not prevent
full administrative consideration of his argument. Counsel could have obtained no
different administrative result.”).
38
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The individuated case-by-case approach explicitly identified
in Gagnon, and ratified in the immigration realm by AguileraEnriquez, has been adopted, with significant variations, by a
number of sister circuits. The Third, Sixth, Seventh, and D.C.
Circuits have applied the “fundamental fairness” standard.45
However, the Fourth, Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have
employed a harmless error standard that inquires whether
deficient procedural safeguards resulted in prejudice that likely
impacted the results of the proceedings.46 These different
approaches reflect sharply differing views of enforcing the Fifth
Amendment’s protections. On one hand, the circuits favoring the
fundamental fairness standard ground their position in the view
that the right to counsel is a fundamental right, thereby
obviating the need to demonstrate prejudice. On the other hand,
circuits relying on the prejudice standard share the view that
“because the point of providing noncitizens a right to counsel is to
ensure a fair proceeding under the Fifth Amendment Due
Process Clause, a noncitizen should have to demonstrate that the
denial of the right to counsel caused him or her substantial
prejudice.”47 The resulting circuit split has raised the possibility
that the Supreme Court may one day take up the issue.48
To date, however, regardless of which individuated due
process test is used, there has not been a single instance where
under the prevailing case-by-case approach a constitutional right
to appointed counsel has been found for noncitizens facing
removal.49 This state of affairs gives rise to the commonsense
observation that “it takes a lawyer to get a lawyer.”50 Thus, for

45
See Leslie v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 611 F.3d 171, 180–81 (3d Cir. 2010);
Castaneda-Delgado v. INS, 525 F.2d 1295, 1301 (7th Cir. 1975); Yiu Fong Cheung v.
INS, 418 F.2d 460, 464 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
46
Farrokhi v. INS, 900 F.2d 697, 701 (4th Cir. 1990); Patel v. INS, 803 F.2d 804,
805–06 (5th Cir. 1986); Michelson v. INS, 897 F.2d 465, 467 (10th Cir. 1990);
Rageevan v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 151 F. App’x 751, 753–54 (11th Cir. 2005).
47
Wade Thomas & Andrew Herink, Appealing Denials of Right To Counsel in
Deportation Hearings: Do Noncitizens Have To Show Prejudice?, 90 NO. 14
INTERPRETER RELEASES 831, 834 (2013).
48
Id.
49
See, e.g., THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND
CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 1155 (7th ed. 2012); Johnson, supra note 6, at
2402.
50
See Kaufman, supra note 9, at 137 (“Perhaps this is unsurprising: it takes an
attorney to identify the sorts of complex constitutional or statutory claims that only
an attorney can ‘adequately’ present.”).
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all practical purposes, it appears that the right to an
individualized case-by-case assessment of the right to an
attorney in removal proceedings “is effectively no right at all.”51
II. DUE PROCESS MATHEWS TEST UPDATED FOR TURNER V.
ROGERS
Recent case law expanding on the factors to be considered in
assessing the sufficiency of procedural due process underscore
the United States Supreme Court’s observation that due process
jurisprudence can be expected to evolve over time.52 Until it was
refined by the Court’s 2011 decision in Turner v. Rogers, the
classic Mathews v. Eldridge due process analysis had been the
standard since 1976 by which the protection of constitutional
rights were measured.53 The Mathews test sets forth three
factors to be evaluated: (1) the private interest of the individual
that will be injured by the official action; (2) the risk of error
through the procedures used and probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the
Government’s interest and the fiscal and administrative burdens
that the additional or substitute procedural requirements would
entail.54
In Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, the Court laid
out the specific framework for the application of the Mathews
factors in the context of appointed counsel.55 The Lassiter
petitioner appealed the termination of her parental rights on the
grounds that because she was indigent, she was entitled to the
appointment of counsel under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.56 Relying in part on Gagnon, the Court
held that there exists a “presumption that an indigent litigant

51

Id.
See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20–21 (1956) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (noting that “ ‘[d]ue process’ is, perhaps, the least frozen concept of our
law—the least confined to history and the most absorptive of powerful social
standards of a progressive society”).
53
Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 444 (2011) (“[W]e consequently determine the
‘specific dictates of due process’ by examining the ‘distinct factors’ that this Court
has previously found useful in deciding what specific safeguards the Constitution's
Due Process Clause requires in order to make a civil proceeding fundamentally fair.”
(quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976))).
54
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
55
452 U.S. 18, 26–27 (1981).
56
Id. at 24.
52
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has a right to appointed counsel only when, if he loses, he may be
deprived of his physical liberty.”57 It is against this presumption
that the three Mathews factors must be balanced.58
Despite the prevalence of the application of the Mathews
test, with one notable categorical exception for legal permanent
residents (“LPR”), immigration courts have routinely relied on
outdated pre-Mathews tests to assess the constitutionality of
court procedures.59 To the extent that the Mathews factors
provide a potentially more expansive view of the individual
personal liberty at stake, the reliance on pre-Mathews tests
imposes a higher burden on the noncitizen.60 It was precisely
this focus on the nature of the personal liberty interest at stake
for a returning LPR that tipped the scales in Landon v.
Plasencia.61 Plasencia, an LPR returning from a brief trip to
Mexico, was detained at the border due to her involvement in an
attempt to smuggle aliens across the border.62 At an exclusion
hearing, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”)
denied Plasencia’s admission to the United States. Plaintiff
Plasencia appealed the INS decision on the basis that, among
other things, she was impermissibly denied due process
protections, including adequate notice, appropriate burden of
proof, and an informed waiver of her right to representation.
Subsequent to affirmance by the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court remanded on the basis
that the Mathews test was the appropriate standard to assess
whether Plasencia had been afforded due process and the factors
relevant to the due process analysis had not been adequately
developed in the prior proceedings.63

57

Id. at 26–27.
Id. at 27.
59
See Rageevan v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 151 F. App’x 751, 753–54 (11th Cir. 2005);
Farrokhi v. INS, 900 F.2d 697, 701 (4th Cir. 1990); Michelson v. INS, 897 F.2d 465,
467 (10th Cir. 1990); Patel v. INS, 803 F.2d 804, 805–06 (5th Cir. 1986).
60
Taghavi, supra note 6, at 254 (“[I]t is extraordinarily difficult to demonstrate
that a judge, who has discretionary review, would have decided the case differently
had there been counsel and potential alternative arguments or forms of relief
asserted.”).
61
459 U.S. 21 (1982).
62
Id. at 23.
63
Id. at 34, 37 (“[T]he courts must consider the interest at stake for the
individual, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the interest through the
procedures used as well as the probable value of additional or different procedural
safeguards, and the interest of the government in using the current procedures
58
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The tenor of Justice O’Connor’s opinion may have presaged
the court’s view on the likely outcome of application of the
Mathews factors to Plasencia’s circumstances. Writing for the
majority, Justice O’Connor noted: “Plasencia’s interest here is,
without question, a weighty one. She stands to lose the right ‘to
stay and live and work in this land of freedom.’ Further, she may
lose the right to rejoin her immediate family, a right that ranks
high among the interests of the individual.”64
The government subsequently declined further prosecution
of Plasencia on remand—presumably due to the likelihood that
pro-immigrant due process law would arise from further
litigation of the case.65
Plasencia is generally understood to stand for the proposition
that LPRs in removal proceedings should be afforded the
Mathews due process analytical framework.66 However, no court
has declared that Mathews is inapplicable to non-LPR aliens.67
The counterargument has been advanced that LPRs are in a
sense more deserving of appointed counsel because their
interests at stake are “especially high.”68 Yet, the “weighty”
interest referred to by Justice O’Connor is equally applicable to
non-LPRs—especially those who were brought to this country as
children—who would face the same risk of losing the “right to
stay and live and work” as well as the “right to rejoin [his or] her
immediate family.”69 After Plasencia, LPRs currently stand as
the only immigrant subgroup categorically determined to benefit
from application of the more expansive Mathews factors.

rather than additional or different procedures.” (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976))).
64
Id. at 34 (citation omitted).
65
ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 49, at 560.
66
It has been noted elsewhere that the Plasencia Court for the first time framed
the inquiry regarding the treatment of returning LPRs in constitutional, not
regulatory, terms. See Joseph Landau, Due Process and the Non-Citizen: A
Revolution Reconsidered, 47 CONN. L. REV. 879, 905 (2015). Previous Supreme Court
cases had avoided the constitutional implications by “assimilating” the foreign
nationals’ status to that of a continually present immigrant. Id.; see also Rosenberg
v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449, 459–60 (1963); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590,
596 (1953).
67
Pitsker, supra note 6, at 177.
68
See generally Johnson, supra note 6, at 2405 (alluding to the concomitant
statutory benefits accruing to LPRs (for example, the right to remain indefinitely,
the right to naturalize, and particular forms of relief from removal)).
69
Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 34 (internal quotation mark omitted).
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For non-LPR aliens in removal proceedings, Mathews is
rarely applied. Outmoded pre-Mathews due process analytical
frameworks—no prejudice and harmless error tests—continue to
be employed in most circuit courts without the rigorous balancing
of Mathews factors.70 There are, however, notable instances
where the Mathews framework has been applied to a non-LPR in
removal proceedings. In Ching v. Mayorkas, the Ninth Circuit
evaluated the case of a non-LPR who claimed that her procedural
due process rights were violated during USCIS’s adjudication of
her husband’s visa petition for immediate relative status on her
behalf.71 The crux of her argument was that USCIS relied on
statements from third parties without providing her the
opportunity for cross examination in the face of contradictory
documents and affidavits.72 As the court explained, “[i]n almost
every setting where important decisions turn on questions of fact,
due process requires an opportunity to confront and crossThe court determined that
examine adverse witnesses.”73
USCIS’s invasion of Ching’s right to confront implicated a
property interest and that “[t]he proper analysis to determine
whether additional process was due in this case is provided in
Mathews.”74
Notwithstanding the circuit courts’ reluctance to consistently
apply the Mathews factors in the immigration due process
context, the Supreme Court’s most recent foray into due process
jurisprudence, Turner v. Rogers, has breathed new life into the
argument that appointed counsel is constitutionally required in
removal proceedings.
Turner was held in civil contempt after he repeatedly failed
to make court-ordered payments to respondent Rogers to help
support their child.75 On the first four occasions, he was
sentenced to ninety days’ imprisonment, but he eventually paid
the outstanding amounts.76 The fifth time, he completed a 180-

70
See Rageevan v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 151 F. App’x 751, 753–54 (11th Cir. 2005);
Farrokhi v. INS, 900 F.2d 697, 701 (4th Cir. 1990); Michelson v. INS, 897 F.2d 465,
467 (10th Cir. 1990); Patel v. INS, 803 F.2d 804, 805–06 (5th Cir. 1986).
71
725 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2013).
72
Id. at 1156.
73
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269
(1970)).
74
Id. at 1157.
75
Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 436–37 (2011).
76
Id. at 436.
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day sentence but still did not pay the amount he owed. Turner
was subsequently charged with contempt in his sixth court
appearance.77 Neither Turner nor Rogers were represented by
counsel at any of the contempt hearings.78 At the sixth hearing,
the family court judge found Turner in willful contempt and
sentenced him to twelve months in prison without making any
finding as to his ability to pay.79 After Turner completed his
sentence, the South Carolina Supreme Court rejected his claim
that he was constitutionally entitled to counsel at the contempt
hearing, concluding that civil contempt does not require all the
constitutional safeguards applicable in criminal contempt
proceedings.80 The United States Supreme Court vacated and
remanded the decision.81
The Court preliminarily addressed the issue of whether
Turner had a right to appointed counsel by noting that it had
previously “found a right to counsel ‘only’ in cases involving
incarceration, not that a right to counsel exists in all such
cases.”82 Not having found a categorical right to counsel, the
Court next turned to the Mathews balancing test to weigh the
“distinct factors” necessary to determine what procedural
safeguards were needed to make the proceedings fundamentally
fair.83 In assessing the first factor, the Court found that the
private interest to be affected “argue[d] strongly for the right to
counsel.”84 The Court also found that the second factor, the risk
of erroneous deprivation, supported the appointment of counsel
inasmuch as the “failure of trial courts to make a determination
of a contemnor’s ability to comply is not altogether infrequent.”85
Here, the Court noted that the ability to pay constitutes a
“dividing line” between civil and criminal contempt inasmuch as
a civil contemnor can avoid or purge the sentence, whereas a
criminal contemnor must serve the sentence regardless of later
compliance with the court order.86 An incorrect decision that

77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86

Id. at 436–37.
Id.
Id. at 437.
Id. at 438.
Id. at 449.
Id. at 443.
Id. at 444.
Id. at 445.
Id. at 446 (quoting McBride v McBride, 334 N.C. 124, 131, n.4 (1993)).
Id. 445.
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wrongly classifies the contempt proceeding as civil deprives the
defendant of the procedural protections, including appointed
counsel, which would inhere if the proceedings were classified as
criminal.87
In deciding against Turner’s right to appointed counsel, the
Court found the probable value of “additional or substitute
procedural safeguards” to be outcome-determinative.88 The Court
identified three related considerations that militated against the
appointment of counsel. First, determination of the ability-topay was relatively straightforward—thus diminishing the need
for counsel.89 Second, the opposing party in child support cases is
also regularly unrepresented and consequently the appointment
of counsel to the noncustodial parent would create “an
asymmetry of representation” that could make the proceeding
less fair overall.90 The third consideration was that there existed
an alternative set of procedural safeguards that could
significantly reduce the risk of erroneous deprivation of liberty.
The Court identified these additional safeguards as: (1) notifying
the defendant that his “ability to pay” is a critical issue in the
contempt proceeding; (2) the use of a form to elicit the
defendant’s relevant financial information; (3) an opportunity at
the hearing for the defendant to address his financial status; and
(4) an express determination by the court of the defendant’s
ability to pay.91
The Court concluded that the family court judge failed to
substantively adhere to the additional safeguards that were
necessary to make Turner’s civil contempt proceeding
fundamentally fair.92 Consequently, the contempt proceeding
violated due process and the lower court’s decision was vacated
and remanded for additional fact gathering in compliance with
the ignored safeguards.93
On its face, the language in Turner that the Due Process
Clause “does not automatically require”94 the appointment of
counsel at a civil contempt hearing to an indigent individual
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94

Id.
Id. at 446 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
Id.
Id. at 447.
Id. at 447–48.
Id. at 449.
Id.
Id. at 448.
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facing incarceration appears to limit the prospects for civil
Gideon in the immigration context.
However, the Court’s
decision provides a promising path for the establishment of a
categorical right to appointed counsel for certain vulnerable
groups in removal proceedings. The Turner Court expressly
limited its holding to proceedings where the opposing party is not
represented by counsel and where the case at hand is not
unusually complex.95 These two conditions—asymmetrical legal
representation and the complex nature of the case—which serve
to limit the central holding in Turner, are the hallmarks of
immigration court proceedings.
A.

Asymmetrical Legal Representation in Immigration
Proceedings

Unlike the equipoise posture contemplated by the decision in
Turner, there exists a structural asymmetry in legal
representation in immigration proceedings that produces stark
disparities in legal outcomes.
It is axiomatic that the government is represented by counsel
at all times in the removal hearings. It falls to attorneys within
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), an agency
operating within the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”),
to prosecute the government’s case. As of November 2014, there
were almost 1,000 ICE attorneys assigned to immigration
enforcement and prosecution.96 This level of attorney staffing
represents a sharp increase from the 600 ICE attorneys
employed in May 200497 and reflects the heightened priority
placed on removals under the Obama Administration.98
In contrast to the constant presence of government counsel
in removal proceedings, EOIR data indicates that only slightly
more than half of the individuals haled before an immigration

95

Id. at 448–49.
Complaint at 3, Vroom v. Johnson, No. CV-14-02463-PHX-JAT, 2015 WL
3490086 (D. Ariz., June 3, 2015).
97
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., DHS IMMIGRATION ATTORNEYS:
WORKLOAD ANALYSIS AND WORKFORCE PLANNING EFFORTS LACK DATA AND
DOCUMENTATION 9 (2007), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07206.pdf.
98
The Obama Administration deported an average of 400,000 individuals
between 2005 and 2013, representing a sixty percent increase over the 250,000
annual average under the Bush Administration. See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2013
YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 103 (2014), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/
default/files/publications/Yearbook_Immigration_Statistics_2013_0.pdf.
96
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court in 2014 were represented.99 The meager fifty-five percent
representation rate, nonetheless, represents a significant
improvement from the average thirty-eight percent rate recorded
by EOIR from 2005 through 2009.100 The reported increase in the
rate of representation has led at least one commentator to
conclude that the percentage of noncitizens appearing with
counsel has improved in recent years.101 However, the apparent
increase in representation rates is more likely explained by a
change in EOIR’s calculation methodology that expanded the
number of persons classified as represented by simply changing
the definition of “represented.”102
Another explanation for the apparent increase in the rate of
representation—to the still anemic fifty-five percent rate
recorded in 2014—may be related to the type of representation
being provided. Under the current statutes, an individual in
removal proceeding may be represented by an attorney, a law
student whose appearance is supervised by an attorney, an
“accredited representative[],” or a “reputable individual[].”103
99
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2014 STATISTICS YEARBOOK F1 (2015),
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/pages/attachments/2015/03/16/fy14syb.pdf.
100
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2009 STATISTICS YEARBOOK G1 (2010),
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2010/03/04/fy09syb.pdf.
101
COLUM. L. SCH. HUM. RIGHTS INST., EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE: ENSURING
MEANINGFUL ACCESS TO COUNSEL IN CIVIL CASES, INCLUDING IMMIGRATION
PROCEEDINGS 5 (2014), http://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/
human-rights-institute/files/equal_access_to_justice_-_cerd_shadow_report.pdf.
102
Prior to 2011, EOIR determined representation rates by looking at whether a
noncitizen had counsel at a particular proceeding. In 2011, the new methodology
classified an individual as represented if he or she was represented at any point in a
particular case. To illustrate, if a person appeared without counsel in 2007 but later
appeared with counsel in 2009, he or she would have been classified as
“unrepresented” in 2007 and “represented” in 2008. Under the new methodology, the
same individual would have been classified as “represented” in both years. See Joan
Friedland, Falling Through the Cracks: How Gaps in ICE’s Prosecutorial Discretion
Policies Affect Immigrants Without Legal Representation, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL 9
n.1 (May 2012), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/re
search/friedland_-_unrepresented_immigrants_051412.pdf.
103
8 C.F.R. § 1292.1(a) (2016). An “accredited representative” is a nonprofit
religious, charitable, or social organization that provides its services free of charge
and has been designated by the Board of Immigration Appeals to have adequate
knowledge and experience to practice in immigration court. Id. § 1292.2(a). A
“reputable individual” is a person of good moral character, appearing at the request
of the individual seeking representation, without seeking remuneration, and has a
pre-existing relationship with the individual seeking representation—for example,
as a relative, neighbor, clergy, or personal friend. § 1292.1(a)(3). The pre-existing
relationship requirement may be waived where representation would not otherwise
be available. Id.
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Thus, a portion of the overall rate of representation reported by
EOIR may be due to an increase in the rate of nonattorney
representation—for example, representation by a law student,
accredited representative, or reputable individual.
Importantly, aggregated representation statistics mask large
disparities in representation rates among immigrant subgroups.
For instance, in 2007 nearly sixty percent of noncitizens in
immigration proceedings were unrepresented. However, among
the subgroup of detained noncitizens, a staggering eighty-four
percent went to court without representation.104
The asymmetry in legal representation is significant because
having a lawyer has a profound impact on the likelihood of
success in immigration proceedings. A study of New York State
noncitizens appearing in immigration court found that those with
representation were almost six times more likely to have a
successful outcome than unrepresented immigrants.105 Similarly,
EOIR data indicates that asylum seekers with legal
representation were nearly five times more likely to be granted
asylum.106 Again, aggregation masks striking differences in legal
outcomes. Among the immigrant subgroup of asylum seekers in
expedited removal,107 asylum seekers without a lawyer have been
found more than 12.5 times less likely to be granted asylum.108
Admittedly, there exists the possibility of “selection bias”—that
104
Nina Siulic et al., Improving Efficiency and Promoting Justice in the
Immigration System: Lessons from the Legal Orientation Program, VERA INST. OF
JUST. (May 2008), http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/LOP_
Evaluation_May2008_final.pdf.
105
Accessing Justice: The Availability and Adequacy of Counsel in Immigration
Proceedings, N.Y. IMMGR. REPRESENTATION STUDY 20 (Dec. 2011), https://www.ils.
ny.gov/files/Accessing%20Justice.pdf.
106
Asylum Denial Rate Reaches All Time Low: FY 2010 Results, a Twenty-Five
Year Perspective, TRAC IMMIGR. (Sept. 2, 2010), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/
reports/240.
107
“Expedited Removal” is the process that DHS uses to remove people from the
U.S. who attempt to enter the country without proper documentation. If an
immigration officer determines that a noncitizen is inadmissible, the officer shall
order the alien removed from the United States without further hearing or review
unless the noncitizen indicates either an intention to apply for asylum or a fear of
persecution. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A) (2012).
108
Over the period from 2000 to 2004, asylum seekers without a lawyer had a
two-percent chance of being granted asylum while those with an attorney had a
twenty-five-perent chance of being granted asylum. See U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, REPORT ON ASYLUM SEEKERS IN EXPEDITED REMOVAL 4
(2005), http://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/resources/stories/pdf/asylum_seekers/
Volume_I.pdf.
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is, attorneys take only the most winnable cases—however, the
striking size of the disparity in legal outcomes strongly suggests
that the absence of counsel is a determining factor in whether a
noncitizen will be removed.
Thus, in immigration proceedings, not only does there exist
an asymmetry in legal representation, thereby meeting the first
limiting condition of Turner, the impact of the imbalance in
representation significantly affects legal outcomes.
B.

The Unusually Complex Nature of Immigration Law

Nor is the second condition circumscribing the Turner
decision—that the case at hand not be “unusually complex”—
fulfilled in the case of immigration proceedings. In fact, the
sharp differences in outcomes that arise because of the
asymmetry in legal representation are in large part due to the
unusually complex nature of immigration law.
The opacity of immigration law arises from the piecemeal
manner in which the INA has been amended. Since its initial
passage in 1952, periodic changes to the statutory schema,
including major revisions in 1986, 1990, and 1996, have resulted
in the gradual accumulation of increasing layers of complexity.
The end result is a body of law that is a “baffling skein of
provisions,”109 where “plain words do not always mean what they
say”110 and “morsels of comprehension must be pried from
mollusks of jargon.”111
Further complicating the situation, several agencies—U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Customs and
Border Protection, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services,
and the Department of Justice—and judicial bodies—Executive
Office for Immigration Review, Board of Immigration Appeals,
and federal district and circuit courts—interpret the INA,
resulting in inconsistent interpretations and frequent circuit
splits.

109
110
111

Lok v. INS, 548 F.2d 37, 38 (2d Cir. 1977).
Yuen Sang Low v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 479 F.2d 820, 821 (9th Cir. 1973).
Dong Sik Kwon v. INS, 646 F.2d 909, 919 (5th Cir. 1981).
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As a result of the “labyrinthine character”112 of modern
immigration law, unrepresented immigrants are profoundly
prejudiced in presenting their cases in immigration court. Even
trained legal advocates may not be up to the task. As a
consequence of Padilla v. Kentucky,113 holding that a criminal
defense lawyer is obligated to advise noncitizen clients of the
collateral immigration consequences of a guilty plea, the
American Bar Association (“ABA”) advises practicing criminal
law attorneys to establish relationships with immigration law
experts and refer clients to them when the consequences of a plea
deal on immigration status are unclear.114
The prejudice to the unrepresented immigrant arising from
the adiaphanous nature of immigration law extends beyond the
immigration courtroom. A noncitizen who appears pro se is also
disadvantaged in seeking administrative forms of relief from the
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”).
Following DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson’s November 2014
directive, ICE attorneys were instructed to prioritize and focus
their removal efforts with the intent that those cases that did not
meet agency priorities would be suspended in an exercise of
Discretionary case closure data
prosecutorial discretion.115
indicate, however, that in practice, while some ICE attorneys
“take seriously the responsibility of equitable prosecutorial
discretion, others seem to regard it as optional or nonexistent.”116
Consequently, the daunting challenge for noncitizens appearing
pro se is to decipher how to request a favorable exercise of
discretion and to fully appreciate what exactly an offer of
prosecutorial discretion entails. Unrepresented individuals are
112
Drax v. Reno, 338 F.3d 98, 99–100 (2d Cir. 2003) (observing that the body of
immigration law is “a maze of hyper-technical statutes and regulations that
engender waste, delay, and confusion”).
113
559 U.S. 356 (2010).
114
Maggie Arias & Benjamin Waxman, Practice Tips & Ethics for Criminal
Defense Attorneys Representing Noncitizen Clients, A.B.A. CRIM. JUST. SEC. NEWSL.
6 (2012), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/criminal_jus
tice_section_newsletter/arias_waxman_fall2012.authcheckdam.pdf.
115
Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,
to Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Dir., U.S. Immigration and Customs Enf’t, et al.
(Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_
prosecutorial_discretion.pdf.
116
Jason A. Cade, The Challenge of Seeing Justice Done in Removal
Proceedings, 89 TUL. L. REV. 1, 32 (2014) (citing data that suggests significant
disparities in the rate of grants of prosecutorial discretion between courts with
similarly sized dockets).
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unlikely to have the expertise to successfully navigate the highly
formalistic process by making their request at the appropriate
time, in the necessary format, and with a sufficient level of a
documentation to survive a denial of discretion. Inasmuch as
discretionary decisions made by immigration authorities are
effectively unreviewable, the denial of an insufficiently detailed
request for prosecutorial discretion can have irremediably lasting
consequences.117
An individual lacking immigration counsel is also likely to be
unaware of the significant implications of a grant of prosecutorial
discretion. Administrative closure—a “procedural convenience
that authorizes the temporary removal of proceedings from the
[c]ourt’s calendar while retaining the proceedings on the [c]ourt’s
docket”118—is the primary mechanism through which a favorable
grant of prosecutorial discretion has been granted.119 However,
since a case in administrative closure is not terminated but
merely placed on hold, the right to vindicate a claim for relief is
similarly suspended.
Noncitizens who benefit from
administrative closure are generally not eligible for a work
permit—an employment authorization document (“EAD”) in
immigration parlance—unless they have an independent basis
for the EAD.120 Further, recipients of administrative closure are
ineligible to recover bond money posted to secure their return.121
Consequently, an individual who has a strong legal claim for
relief would be ill advised to accept an offer of administrative
closure. Without a complete understanding of the benefits and
potentially significant disadvantages of a grant of prosecutorial
discretion, an unrepresented individual is prejudiced in making
an informed decision about case strategy.
117
See 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (a)(2)(B)(ii) (2012) (stating that “no court shall have
jurisdiction to review . . . any other decision or action . . . which is specified under
this subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney General or the Secretary of
Homeland Security”).
118
US CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS: USCIS–AILA
MEETING 11 (Oct. 9, 2012), http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Outreach/
Notes%20from%20Previous%20Engagements/2012/October%202012/AILA-LiaisonCommittee-meetingQA.pdf.
119
Prosecutorial Discretion Implementation: Synthesis of Chapter Reports, AILA
6 (Jan. 31, 2012), https://cliniclegal.org/sites/default/files/January%2031,%202012%2
0AILA%20Synthesis%20of%20Chapter%20Rep.pdf.
120
Id. at 7.
121
U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OMB NO. 1653-0022, IMMIGRATION BOND,
https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Document/2016/i352.pdf.
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Thus, in the context of Turner’s second limiting condition—
the relative complexity of the body of law at issue—the
appointment of counsel in immigration proceedings is necessary
to ensure adequate due process.
C.

Applying Mathews and Turner Factors to Franco-Gonzalez v.
Holder

Jose Antonio Franco-Gonzalez was the named plaintiff in a
class action suit filed on August 2, 2010.122 At the time, Mr.
Franco-Gonzalez was a twenty-nine-year-old native and citizen of
Mexico. His parents were both lawful permanent residents of the
United States. Mr. Franco-Gonzalez was one of eleven siblings
who lived in the U.S. All of the Franco-Gonzalez siblings who
resided in the U.S. had, or were in the process of obtaining, legal
status at the time of the complaint: Mr. Franco-Gonzalez’s three
eldest brothers were U.S. citizens; two of his sisters were lawful
permanent residents; and Mr. Franco-Gonzalez and five of his
siblings had pending family petitions for adjustment of status to
law permanent resident.123
Mr. Franco-Gonzalez had a documented diagnosis of
“moderate mental retardation,” indicating an IQ level in the
range of thirty-five to fifty-five. His cognitive development was
atypical: he was unable to speak until the age of six or seven. At
the time of the complaint, he was unable to tell time, had
difficulty identifying numbers and counting, and did not know
his own birthday or age. Psychological reports estimated his
cognitive functionality at the level of a two-year-old.124
He was arrested in April 2004 and accused of throwing a
rock during a fight between two gangs. Mr. Franco-Gonzalez
pleaded guilty to an aggravated felony—assault with a deadly
weapon—spent a year in jail and then was transferred to
immigration custody for removal proceedings in April 2005. A
court-ordered psychiatric evaluation concluded that FrancoGonzalez “did not understand the nature of his removal

122
Third Amended Class-Action Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief
and Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at ¶ 11, Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, No. CV
10-2211 DMG (DTB), 2011 WL 12677104 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2011).
123
Id. ¶ 32.
124
Id.
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proceedings.”125 Having been deemed incompetent to represent
himself, an immigration judge ordered the administrative closure
of Mr. Franco-Gonzalez’s case in June 2005. Yet, Mr. FrancoGonzalez remained detained for almost four-and-a-half more
years, despite the fact that there were no open removal
proceedings against him. It was the government’s position that
Mr. Franco-Gonzalez fell into the category of noncitizens who are
mandatorily detained based on their conviction of an aggravated
felony pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).126
In December 2009, DHS moved to end the period of
administrative closure and reinstate removal proceedings. In
March 2010, after nearly five years in immigration custody, Mr.
Franco-Gonzalez with the assistance of pro bono counsel filed a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Four days after filing the
writ, Mr. Franco-Gonzalez was released from detention subject to
electronic monitoring pending a merits hearing on his case.
In August 2010, Mr. Franco-Gonzalez filed a class action
complaint on behalf of a class of similarly situated plaintiffs.127
After several amendments, the class was eventually certified in
November 2011 and consisted of:
All individuals who are or will be in DHS custody for removal
proceedings in California, Arizona, and Washington who have
been identified by or to medical personnel, DHS, or an
Immigration Judge, as having a serious mental disorder or
defect that may render them incompetent to represent
themselves in detention or removal proceedings, and who
presently lack counsel in their detention or removal
proceedings.128

The final amended complaint alleged causes of action rooted in
alleging various violations of the INA, the Due Process Clause,
the Administrative Procedures Act, and § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act.129
125
Gonzalez v. United States, No. CV-12-01912 DMG (DTBx), 2013 WL 942363,
at *1 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2013).
126
Id. at *3.
127
Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, No. CV 10-02211 DMG (DTBx), 2013 WL
3674492, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2013).
128
Id. at *2.
129
Id. (“The third amended complaint allege[d] the following causes of action:
(1) right to a competency evaluation under the INA; (2) right to a competency
evaluation under the Due Process Clause; (3) right to appointed counsel under the
INA; (4) right to appointed counsel under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §
794 (“§ 504”); (5) right to appointed counsel under the Due Process Clause; (6) right
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The United States District Court for the Central District of
California issued a permanent injunction in April 2013 ordering
that legal representation through a qualified representative must
be provided to immigrant detainees with mental disabilities who
are facing removal and who are unable to represent themselves
in immigration court.130
The court defined “qualified
representative” as an attorney, a law student or law graduate
directly supervised by a retained attorney, or an accredited
representative.131
Importantly, the court found the basis for the plaintiffs’ relief
under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act by deciding that the
plaintiffs were unable to meaningfully access the immigration
court.132 In an exercise of constitutional avoidance, the court
found that it was not necessary to reach the constitutional
dimensions of the plaintiffs’ claim.133
The following subsections will apply the Mathews factors and
Turner conditions to Franco-Gonzalez to demonstrate that, had
the constitutional claims been considered, the same order for
legal representation would have resulted.
1.

Mathews Factor No. 1: The Nature of the Private Interest at
Stake

The applicability of the dominant Mathews test in the
context of immigration proceedings was established in Plasencia.
The Court used the familiar language of Mathews to frame its
analysis of plaintiff Plasencia’s claim.134 Although Plasencia was
an LPR, no court has stated that application of the Mathews due

to release under the INA; (7) right to release under the Due Process Clause; (8) right
to a detention hearing under the INA; (9) right to a detention hearing under [§] 504;
(10) right to a detention hearing under the Due Process Clause; and (11) violation of
the Administrative Procedures Act.”) Id.
130
Id. at *16.
131
Id. at *5.
132
Id. (“[F]inding that [§] 504 is not limited to intentional discrimination alone,
but ‘requires that an otherwise qualified handicapped individual must be provided
with meaningful access to the benefit’ ” (quoting Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287,
301 (1985))).
133
Id. at *9.
134
See supra Part II.

2016]

REVISITING FRANCO-GONZALEZ

941

process test is inappropriate for non-LPR aliens.135 Indeed,
Plasencia makes no distinction regarding the immigration status
of the noncitizen.136
Similar to Ching v. Mayorkas,137 wherein the Ninth Circuit
used the Mathews framework in the case of a non-LPR to
evaluate a due process deprivation arising from the lack of
opportunity to confront, the invasion of Mr. Franco-Gonzalez’s
right to confront also required a Mathews analysis.
The
government argued that Mr. Gonzalez fell into the category of
noncitizens
who
are
mandatorily
detained
under
8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). Ordinarily, individuals who find themselves
subject to mandatory detention have the right to a Joseph
hearing where an immigration judge will determine whether the
individual is properly classified within the group for whom
mandatory detention is obligatory.138 Here, Mr. Franco-Gonzalez
was placed in immigration detention after pleading guilty to an
aggravated felony, but he never attended a Joseph hearing before
an immigration judge to determine whether his detention was
mandatory under § 1226(c). Thus, the court found that Mr.
Franco-Gonzalez “had no opportunity to present evidence or
argument that he was not properly included in the mandatory
detention category and his detention never became ‘mandatory’
under [§] 1226(c).”139 This deprivation is nearly identical to the
issue at hand in Ching, which utilized the Mathews test for a
non-LPR.
Regarding the nature of the interest at stake, it is instructive
to recall Justice O’Connor’s language in Plasencia that the
private liberty interest for individuals in removal proceedings “is,

135

See id.
Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982) (“In evaluating the [sufficiency of
due process] procedures in any case, the courts must consider the interest at stake
for the individual, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the interest through the
procedures used as well as the probable value of additional or different procedural
safeguards, and the interest of the government in using the current procedures
rather than additional or different procedures.”).
137
725 F.3d 1149 (9th Cir. 2013).
138
In Joseph, the Board of Immigration Appeals held that an alien is “properly
included in a mandatory detention category only when an Immigration Judge is
convinced that the Service is substantially unlikely to establish, at the merits
hearing, the charge or charges that subject the alien to mandatory detention.” 22 I.
& N. Dec. 799, 800 (B.I.A. 1999).
139
Gonzalez v. United States, No. CV-12-01912 DMG (DTBx), 2013 WL 942363,
at *4 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2013).
136
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without question, a weighty one.”140 Like the plaintiff Plasencia,
Mr. Franco-Gonzalez risked losing the “right to stay and live and
work in the United States” and “the right to rejoin [his]
immediate family.”141 This deprivation was also at the heart of
Padilla v. Kentucky, wherein the Court elided the distinction
between direct and collateral consequences of a criminal
conviction—recognizing that “[o]ur law has enmeshed criminal
convictions and the penalty of deportation for nearly a
century.”142 Even before Padilla, the Court recognized that
“[p]reserving the client’s right to remain in the United States
may be more important to the client than any potential jail
sentence.”143
Beyond a general liberty interest, Mr. Franco-Gonzalez
possessed additional compelling private interests. His prolonged
imprisonment after the administrative close of his case
implicated his constitutionally protected interest in avoiding
detention. In Zadvydas, the Court explained: “[G]overnment
detention violates [the Due Process] Clause unless the detention
is ordered in a criminal proceeding with adequate procedural
protections, or, in certain special and ‘narrow’ non-punitive
‘circumstances,’ where a special justification, such as harmthreatening mental illness, outweighs the ‘individual’s
constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical
restraint.’ ”144
The detention at issue in Mr. Franco-Gonzalez’s case was
clearly civil inasmuch as he had completed his one-year jail
sentence before being transferred to ICE custody. The relevant
inquiry then is whether a sufficient “special justification” existed
for his continued imprisonment. Mr. Franco-Gonzalez was
convicted of assault with a deadly nonfirearm weapon for his role
in a rock-throwing incident between two gangs. In Demore v.
Hyung Joon Kim, the Court upheld mandatory detention of
noncitizens in removal proceedings who had committed certain
criminal acts including the act for which Mr. Franco-Gonzalez
was convicted.145 The Demore holding, however, does not govern
140

Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 34.
Id. (internal quotation mark omitted).
142
559 U.S. 356, 365–66 (2010).
143
INS v. St. Cyr., 533 U.S. 289, 322 (2001) (quoting 3 Bender, Criminal
Defense Techniques §§ 60A.01, 60A.02[2] (1999)).
144
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (citations omitted).
145
538 U.S. 510, 531 (2003).
141
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Mr. Franco-Gonzalez because his removal proceeding was
administratively closed and he had no open removal proceedings
against him while he was detained for almost five years. Mr.
Franco-Gonzalez’s circumstances fall closer to the ambit of
Zadvydas, which addressed the question of indefinite detention
after removal proceedings had been concluded or terminated.
The Zadvydas court found that the public safety justification for
indefinite detention was “weak or nonexistent where removal
seems a remote possibility.”146 To the extent that Mr. FrancoGonzalez’s profound cognitive deficiencies were unlikely to
improve and he had been unable to enlist the services of an
attorney while he was detained, removal was a “remote
possibility” for him. Thus, under Zadvydas, the continued
detention was a violation of Mr. Gonzalez’s constitutionally
protected interest in avoiding physical restraint.
2.

Mathews Factor No. 2: Risk of Erroneous Deprivation

The second Mathews factor—the risk of erroneous
deprivation through the procedures used and probable value, if
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards—also
supported the appointment of counsel for Mr. Franco-Gonzalez.
At the time of Mr. Franco-Gonzalez’s claim, the detention of
noncitizens with mental disabilities was not altogether
infrequent. Although there are no regular procedures used by
DHS or ICE to identify the number of detainees who have mental
disabilities, ICE estimated that in 2008 between two percent and
five percent of all immigration detainees possessed a “serious
mental illness.”147 In 2010—the year of Mr. Franco-Gonzalez’s
class action complaint—ICE detained approximately 363,000
foreign nationals.148 Assuming that the rate of mental illness did
not change appreciably between 2008 and 2010, approximately
7,300 to 18,200 detainees had a serious and persistent mental
disability at the time of Mr. Franco-Gonzalez’s initial complaint.
By 2013, due to the uptick in detentions under the Obama

146

Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690.
Third Amended Class-Action Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief
and Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at ¶ 25, Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, No. CV
10-2211 DMG (DTB), 2011 WL 12677104 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2011).
148
Immigration Enforcement Actions: 2010, 2011 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.
ANN. REP. 1, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/enforcementar-2010.pdf.
147
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Administration, between 8,800 and 22,100 detainees were
mentally disabled, thus supporting the contention that the risk of
erroneous deprivation is not infrequent.149
Moreover, the risk of erroneous deprivation is enhanced due
to the nature of Mr. Franco-Gonzalez’s disability. His cognitive
deficiencies significantly impeded his ability to represent himself.
With his limited intellect, Mr. Franco-Gonzalez would be unable
to understand documents, including the Notice to Appear related
to his removal proceedings.150 In the event he successfully
navigated himself to the hearing on time, his mental disability
would play a role in increasing his risk of an erroneous ruling
since individuals with low intellectual acuity are often
excessively deferential to adult authority and unwilling or unable
to assert themselves in a forceful manner.
The Franco-Gonzalez court explicitly addressed the
inadequacy of procedural safeguards to prevent erroneous
deprivation for incompetent noncitizens in immigration
proceedings. The court evaluated the precedential decision
issued by the B.I.A. in Matter of M-A-M-, which expanded the
scope of procedural safeguards provided by federal statute.151 MA-M- provided guidance on: (1) when an immigration judge
should make competency determinations; (2) what factors the
immigration judge should consider and what procedures should
be employed to make those determinations; and (3) what
additional safeguards an immigration judge should prescribe to
ensure that proceedings are sufficiently fair when competency is
not established.152 The Franco-Gonzalez court observed that
these additional judicially imposed safeguards were insufficient
because the majority of them were “left to the Immigration

149
Based on a total of 441,00 detained aliens. See Immigration Enforcement
Actions: 2014, 2014 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. ANN. REP. 1, http://www.dhs.gov/
sites/default/files/publications/ois_enforcement_ar_2013.pdf.
150
This undermines the presumption usually made that the adult to whom mail
was addressed had read it.
151
25 I. & N. Dec. 474, 481–83 (B.I.A. 2011).
152
Id. at 476. The potential additional procedural safeguards included
continuing the removal proceeding to allow the noncitizen to obtain representation;
waiving the respondent’s appearance; actively aiding in development of the record,
including the examination and cross-examination of witnesses; and reserving appeal
rights for the noncitizen. Id. at 483.

2016]

REVISITING FRANCO-GONZALEZ

945

Judge’s discretion, and none guarantee that the incompetent
alien may participate in his proceedings as fully as an individual
who is not disabled.”153
Likewise, the other prong of the Mathews second factor—the
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards—was similarly not satisfied at the time of the FrancoGonzalez August 2010 complaint. In April 2009, immigration
judge Mimi Tsankov observed in a DOJ publication that the
“[EOIR] has not yet issued policy memoranda establishing
procedures for mentally incompetent respondents in removal
proceedings.”154 The EOIR explicitly referenced Judge Tsankov’s
article in an updated Immigration Judge Benchbook155 but failed
to articulate new systemic procedural safeguards to address the
deficiencies cited in Tsankov’s article. The EOIR opted instead to
“inform the Immigration Judge’s decision-making process in this
context by highlighting relevant authority and persuasive
references, by suggesting best practices, and by offering links to
external reference tools.”156
Efforts by advocacy organizations to urge the Attorney
General to develop additional procedural safeguards were also
unsuccessful. In July 2009, approximately sixty organizations
and individuals wrote to Attorney General Holder identifying the
problems facing noncitizens with mental disabilities in
immigration proceedings and outlining proposed modifications in
regulations and immigration court practices.
Among the
proposed changes were: (1) appointment of counsel to all persons
with mental disabilities; (2) appointment of guardians ad litem—
in addition to appointed counsel; (3) revision of existing
regulations and the adoption of new regulations to standardize
immigration proceedings; and (4) the provision of training

153
Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, No. CV 10-02211 DMG (DTBx), 2013 WL
3674492, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2013).
154
Mimi E. Tsankov, Incompetent Respondents in Removal Proceedings, 3
IMMIGR. L. ADVSIOR 1, 2 (2009), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/
2009/07/24/vol3no4.pdf.
155
The Immigration Judge Benchbook is a tool published by the Executive
Office for Immigration Review for use by immigration judges to assist in the
adjudication of immigration cases.
156
Immigration Judge Benchbook: Mental Health Issues, U.S. DEP’T JUST.,
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/immigration-judge-benchbook-mental-health-issues (last
updated Feb. 5, 2015).
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programs and materials to all immigration judges.157 The letter
requested that the Attorney General utilize his statutory
authority to prescribe the proposed safeguards. As of the date of
Franco-Gonzalez’s complaint, the Attorney General had failed to
provide any further safeguards.158
That is not to say that the Attorney General neglected to
take any action to address the lack of adequate procedural
safeguards. In October 2009, the EOIR reported that it had
begun to lead training sessions for EOIR legal staff specifically
focused on handling cases involving individuals with mental
disabilities.159 The EOIR also began to develop standards of
competence in removal proceedings and through its Legal
Orientation and Pro Bono program began to explore how it might
identify individuals with possible mental disabilities for referral
to pro bono services.160 Concurrently, the DHS also began to
evaluate potential additional procedures to protect the rights of
detained respondents with mental disabilities. The DHS issued a
report in late 2009 noting the need for improvements in
identifying and meeting the needs of mentally disabled detainees
and recommending that “ICE should develop specialized
caseloads of aliens including those who are chronically,
medically, or mentally ill or have been detained a significant
length of time to improve case management and expedite
removal, release or relief.”161 However, all of these efforts
remained in their preliminary stages and no additional
procedural safeguards were implemented by the time the FrancoGonzalez complaint was filed.162
157
Letter from Merrill Rotter, Dir., Div. of Law & Psychiatry, Albert Einstein
Coll. of Medicine et al., to The Hon. Eric Holder, Att’y Gen. of the U.S. (July 24,
2009), https://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/assets/files/Letter%20to%20AG%20Hol
der%20_Mental%20Health.pdf.
158
Third Amended Class-Action Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief
and Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at ¶¶ 128-129, Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder,
No. CV 10-2211 DMG (DTB), 2011 WL 12677104 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2011).
159
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AILA-EOIR LIAISON MEETING AGENDA QUESTIONS
AND ANSWERS, 2–3 (Oct. 28, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/eoiraila1028
09.pdf.
160
Id.
161
Dr. Dora Schirro, Immigration Detention Overview and Recommendations,
U.S. DEP’T. OF HOMELAND SEC. 22 (Oct. 6, 2009), http://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/
offices/odpp/pdf/ice-detention-rpt.pdf.
162
On April 22, 2013, the day before the Franco-Gonzalez order was issued, both
the EOIR and the ICE issued guidance detailing additional procedural safeguards
for noncitizens with competency issues in removal proceedings. The new EOIR

2016]

3.

REVISITING FRANCO-GONZALEZ

947

Mathews Factor No. 3: The Government’s Interest

The third Mathews factor calls for an assessment of the
government’s interest in using the current procedures rather
than additional or different procedures. The Plasencia Court
recognized that this countervailing interest was also a “weighty”
one.163 On its face, Mr. Franco-Gonzalez’s constitutional claim
requiring that the government provide appointed counsel to all
class members of detained noncitizens with mental disabilities
appears
prohibitively
expensive.
However,
when
counterbalancing fiscal savings and administrative benefits are
taken into account, the relative weight of the government’s
interest is substantially diminished.
The most significant fiscal savings that would accrue under a
regime of appointed counsel result from the reduction in
detention costs. Recent data indicates that during FY 2014 the
daily cost to taxpayers per immigrant detainee averaged $160,
representing a total annual detention expense of $1.8 billion.164
The DHS’s budget request for FY 2015 increased this expense to
$2.4 billion.165 A major factor driving the expenditures on
immigration detention is the privatization of detention facilities.
Two private prison companies, Corrections Corporation of
procedures included mental competency hearings, mental competency examinations,
and the appointment of counsel. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice: Exec. Office for
Immigration Review, Department of Justice and the Departmentt of Homeland
Security Announce Safeguards for Unrepresented Immigration Detainees with
Serious Mental Disorders or Conditions (Apr. 22, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/eoir/
pr/department-justice-and-department-homeland-security-announce-safeguards-un
represented. The ICE memo outlined new procedures for identification and
assessment for detainees with mental capacity deficits. Memorandum from John
Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigrations & Customs Enf’t, to Thomas D. Homan, Acting
Exec. Assoc. Dir., Enf’t & Removal Operations, et. al. (April 22, 2013), http://www.
ice.gov/doclib/detention-reform/pdf/11063.1_current_id_and_infosharing_detainess_
mental_disorders.pdf.
163
Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982).
164
See The Math of Immigration Detention: Runaway Costs for Immigration
Detention Do Not Add Up to Sensible Policies, NAT’L IMMIGR. F. 1–2 (Aug. 2013),
https://immigrationforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Math-of-ImmigationDetention-August-2013-FINAL.pdf [hereinafter Math] (finding that the average cost
per day per immigrant detainee was $159 in FY 2014); see also, Immigration
Detention: How Can the Government Cut Costs?, HUM. RTS. FIRST (last updated Jan.
2014), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/resource/immigration-detention-how-can-gov
ernment-cut-costs (finding the average per detainee cost was $164 per day).
165
Joshua Breisblatt, The President’s FY 2016 Budget, NAT’L IMMIGR. F. (Feb. 6,
2015), https://immigrationforum.org/blog/the-presidents-fy-2016-budget-departmenthomeland-security.
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America and Geo Group, Inc., dominate the immigration
detention market and together account for as much as seventytwo percent of the privately contracted ICE immigrant detention
beds.166 These companies are powerful advocates for policies that
promote and perpetuate mass incarceration of noncitizens in
removal proceedings.167 Over the span of Mr. Franco-Gonzalez’s
nearly five-year detention, the government spent approximately
$300,000 to imprison him. The cost of appointing counsel for Mr.
Franco-Gonzalez would have been a fraction of the detention
expense.
It is unlikely, however, that any procedural safeguard
requiring the appointment of counsel would require that the
government bear the full expense of representing all indigent
respondents. There already exists a significant network of
nonprofit organizations that provide pro bono representation. In
fact, an integral part of the procedural due process presently
afforded to unrepresented respondents, albeit weak, is the
provision of a list of pro bono providers in the relevant
Thus, a procedural safeguard involving the
jurisdiction.168
appointment of counsel would require the government to serve as
a backstop for those noncitizens unable to procure counsel on
their own.
Additional benefit from appointment of counsel to mentally
disabled detainees would arise from reduced administrative
costs. The immigration courts are hopelessly clogged: as of
November 2015, there were 463,000 pending cases, yielding on

166
Bethany Carson & Eleana Diaz, Payoff: How Congress Ensures Private
Prison Profit with an Immigrant Detention Quota, GRASSROOTS LEADERSHIP (Apr.
2015), http://grassrootsleadership.org/reports/payoff-how-congress-ensures-privateprison-profit-immigrant-detention-quota.
167
See, e.g., Gaming the System: How the Political Strategies of Private Prison
Companies Promote Ineffective Incarceration Policies, JUST. POL’Y INST. (June 2011),
http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/gaming_the_system.pdf
(discussing the private-prison industry’s three-pronged approach to increase profits
through political influence: lobbying, direct campaign contributions, and building
relationships and networks.).
168
One of the purposes of the master calendar hearing is to “advise the
respondent of the availability of free and low-cost legal service providers and provide
the respondent with a list of such providers in the area where the hearing is being
conducted.” U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION COURT PRACTICE MANUAL 67
(2009).
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average a wait of nearly twenty-two months for case resolution.169
More complicated cases like asylum have substantially longer
wait times. Providing counsel to unrepresented noncitizens
would speed dockets by increasing the likelihood that the
respondent is adequately prepared to proceed with his or her
removal proceeding.170 The appointment of counsel would also
reduce the number of requests for continuances since
immigration judges routinely grant such requests to
unrepresented persons to give them more time to find counsel.171
Moreover, appointed counsel would provide courts with the
additional benefit of reducing frivolous claims inasmuch as
counsel would be barred from knowingly participating in such
claims.172 Finally, being represented by counsel is positively
correlated with appearance rates: “children who are represented
have a much higher appearance rate in immigration court,
92.5%, versus 27.5% for unrepresented children.”173
Arguably, the rate of immigration detention—and its
associated expense—may be on the wane and this could
strengthen the government’s interest in the use of current
procedures. The sharp backlash against family detention in
response to the 2014-2015 border surge has prompted the faster
release of detainees.174 Alternatives to detention—for example,

169
Immigration Court Backlog Tool: Pending Cases and Length of Wait in
Immigration Courts, TRAC IMMIGR., http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/court_
backlog (last visited Jan. 29, 2017).
170
See LENNI B. BENSON & RUSSELL R. WHEELER, ENHANCING QUALITY AND
TIMELINESS IN IMMIGRATION REMOVAL ADJUDICATION 56 (2012), https://www.acus.
gov/sites/default/files/documents/Enhancing-Quality-and-Timeliness-in-Immigration
-Removal-Adjudication-Final-June-72012.pdf (finding that among a sample of 166
immigration judges ninety-two-percent agreed with the following statement: “When
the respondent has a competent lawyer, I can conduct the adjudication more
efficiently and quickly”).
171
See Immigration Judge Benchbook: Introduction to the Master Calendar,
U.S. DEP’T JUST. 15, http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2014/08/15/
Purpose_and_History_of_MC.pdf (last visited Jan. 29, 2017) (“If the respondent
states that he or she wishes to have a lawyer, the judge must then continue the
hearing to another master calendar date to afford him or her time to find counsel.”).
172
8 C.F.R. § 1208.20 (2016) (“[A]n asylum application is frivolous if any of its
material elements is deliberately fabricated.”).
173
A Humanitarian Call to Action: Unaccompanied Children in Removal
Proceedings, ABA COMM’N IMMGR. 1 (May 2016), http://www.americanbar.org/cont
ent/dam/aba/administrative/immigration/uacstatement.authcheckdam.pdf.
174
Julia Preston, Judge Orders Release of Immigrant Children Detained by
U.S., N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/26/us/detained-
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ankle bracelets and other monitoring devices, in-person
reporting, home visits, etc.—have become increasingly
prevalent.175 Some have argued that certain alternatives to
detention, specifically ankle bracelets or “grilletes,” are not a true
alternative to detention but rather another means to harass
migrants and to further discourage migration.176 Nonetheless,
the reliance on these devices serves to drive down the overall cost
of detention, lessening the counterbalancing fiscal savings of
appointed counsel for detained mentally disabled noncitizens.
Even assuming an increase in the relative cost of appointed
counsel as the countervailing fiscal savings decline, a dramatic
change in the strength of the government’s interest would not
necessarily be outcome determinative in a Mathews balancing
test. Several commentators have observed that “legal interests
cannot be translated into common currency for comparison.”177
That is, the nature of the respective interests do not lend
themselves to linear quantitative analysis and “the cost of
protecting a constitutional right cannot justify its total denial.”178
The Mathews Court found that “[f]inancial cost alone is not a
controlling weight in determining whether due process requires a
particular procedural safeguard prior to some administrative
decision.”179 Similarly, in Lassiter, the Court found that though
the government’s “pecuniary interest is legitimate,” it could not
overcome “private interests as important as [the termination of
parental rights].”180 A similar argument could be framed using
systems change theory to argue that, as a complex adaptive
system, the current immigration enforcement paradigm distorts
immigrant-children-judge-dolly-gee-ruling.html?smid=nytcore-ipad-share&smprod=
nytcore-ipad.
175
ICE has significantly increased the size of the ATD programs. Between FY
2012 and FY 2013, enrollment of participants in ATD programs increased twentyeight percent. Math, supra note 164, at 10.
176
Marlon Bishop, Why Are Immigrant Mothers Wearing Ankle Monitors?,
LATINO USA (Oct. 23, 2015), www.latinousa.org/2015/10/23/why-are-immigrant-mot
hers-wearing-ankle-monitors.
177
Christopher J. Schmidt, Ending the Mathews v. Eldridge Balancing Test:
Time for a New Due Process Test, 38 SW. L. REV. 287, 290 (2008) (quoting T.
Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943,
973 (1987)); see also Linda Kelly Hill, The Right To Be Heard: Voicing the Due
Process Right to Counsel for Unaccompanied Alien Children, 31 B.C. THIRD WORLD
L.J. 41, 65–68 (2011).
178
Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 825 (1977).
179
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976).
180
Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 28 (1981).
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the operation of the system by focusing on a limited number of
quantifiable targets: removals and fiscal savings.181
These
specific targets can encapsulate only a few elements of our
complex social organization, and their dominance is likely to
undermine other aspects of the organization that are crucial to
its general and long-term welfare, such as economic productivity,
family unity, and community cohesion.182
Consequently, the private interest at stake for Mr. FrancoGonzalez—that is, his physical liberty—was sufficient to
overcome the government’s financial interest in using the current
procedures.
4.

Turner Conditions: Asymmetry of Representation and
Complexity of Immigration Law

The central holding of Turner—that there is no categorical
right to appointed counsel in civil proceedings that may result in
a deprivation of liberty—is constrained by two conditions that
are emblematic of immigration law: asymmetrical legal
representation and a relatively complex body of law. Both of
these limiting conditions were present in Mr. Franco-Gonzalez’s
case and thus support the argument for the appointment of
counsel.
The government is always represented in immigration
proceedings, but nearly eighty-five percent of detained
noncitizens appear pro se.183 This imbalance in representation
yields dramatic differences in outcomes for respondents who
appear in immigration court without counsel. Mr. FrancoGonzalez’s relative disadvantage in appearing unrepresented is
significantly compounded by the nature of his mental disability.
His limited mental acuity would impede his ability to ably
represent himself and would further exacerbate the inequity that
Turner sought to avoid. On his own, Mr. Franco-Gonzalez had
little chance of ever finding a lawyer: his inability to even dial a
telephone prevented him from availing himself of the list of pro
bono attorneys provided to him by the immigration judge.184

181
See JAKE CHAPMAN, SYSTEMS FAILURE: WHY GOVERNMENTS MUST LEARN TO
THINK DIFFERENTLY 51–64 (2d ed. 2004).
182
See Johnson, supra note 6, at 2405.
183
Siulic et al., supra note 104; see discussion supra Section II.A.
184
Cindy Chang, Mentally Disabled Facing Deportation Win Legal Right to Free
Legal Help, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/apr/25/local/
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Similarly, the unusually complex nature of immigration law,
placed Mr. Franco-Gonzalez squarely outside the scope of the
Turner holding.185 Moreover, the basis for the government’s
charge of removability against Mr. Franco-Gonzalez was
grounded in his conviction for an aggravated felony. The
commission of an aggravated felony serves as a bar to most forms
of immigration relief and could mandate mandatory removal.
However, determining whether a particular crime is an
aggravated felony is a formidable challenge.186 The increasingly
tangled skein of “cr-immigration” law—the nexus of criminal and
immigration law—has required that the Supreme Court address
no less than three times in seven years whether certain low-level
crimes constitute aggravated felonies.187
Under Turner, the unusual complexity of immigration law
leads to the conclusion that a respondent in Mr. FrancoGonzalez’s position “can fairly be represented only by a trained
advocate.”188
D. Tallying the Mathews Factors and Turner Conditions
In the aggregate, under a due process analytical framework
based on the three-factor Mathews v. Eldridge test and updated
for the two limiting conditions in Turner v. Rogers, had the
Franco-Gonzalez court reached the certified class’s constitutional
claim, it would have arrived at the same conclusion as when it
decided the “reasonable accommodation” claim:
Indigent
mentally disabled immigrants in removal proceedings are
categorically eligible for appointed counsel.
It has been
demonstrated that the plaintiffs’ private interest at stake—
Mathews factor No. 1—and the risk of erroneous deprivation—
Mathews factor No. 2—outweigh the government’s interest in the
current procedures—Mathews factor No. 3. Further, the two
conditions that expressly limited the Turner ruling—the
la-me-ln-mentally-disabled-immigrants-ruling-20130425 (stating that FrancoGonzalez “doesn’t know how to use a telephone”).
185
See discussion supra Section II.B.
186
In his concurrence to Padilla, Justice Alito noted that because of the
increased complexity of aggravated felony law, the ABA’s Guidebook on Immigration
Law devoted a new thirty–page chapter to the topic . Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S.
356, 378 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring).
187
Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1693 (2013).
188
Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 449 (quoting Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S.
778, 788 (1973)).
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asymmetry in representation and the complexity of the
proceedings—are conspicuously present in immigration
proceedings. Thus, the Franco-Gonzalez class members would
have prevailed in their constitutional claim for a categorical right
to appointed counsel.
III. EXTENDING THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK TO DETAINED
WOMEN AND CHILDREN
The analytical framework that supports Mr. FrancoGonzalez’s constitutional claim also furthers the argument that
other vulnerable groups in immigration removal proceedings
have a right to appointed counsel.
In the broadest sense, under this framework, arguably all
indigent undocumented persons in removal proceeding have a
per se right to appointed counsel. That is, the balancing of the
Mathews factors supplemented by the Turner conditions results
in the categorical right to appointed counsel for all indigent
noncitizens: (1) the United States Supreme Court has recognized
the relative—“weighty”189—importance of the private interest at
stake for individuals facing removal;190 (2) the risk of erroneous
deprivation is high given the huge backlogs in immigration court
and current docket management practices; (3) the potential for
significant fiscal savings and other administrative benefits
diminish the government’s interest in the current procedures;
and (4) the conditions that limited the Turner holding—the
asymmetry in representation and the complexity of the body of
law—are ever present in the case of indigent noncitizens facing
removal.
Due process is, however, an elastic concept that is dependent
upon the circumstances.191 Under an appropriately individuated
approach, certain circumstances may compel an even more
pressing need for augmented procedural due process safeguards.
This section argues, using the Mathews factors supplemented by
189

Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982).
Deportation “may . . . visit as great a hardship as the deprivation of the right
to pursue a vocation or a calling.” Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 147.
191
See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (noting that “due process
is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation
demands”); see also Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy,
367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961) (internal quotation mark omitted) (underscoring that “[d]ue
process, unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content
unrelated to time, place and circumstances”).
190

954

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90:915

Turner, that women and children detained as part of the 20142015 “border surge,” like Marisol and Jennifer, have a
heightened need for the enhanced procedural safeguard provided
by appointed counsel.
A.

The Southwestern Border Surge and Family Detention

In fleeing to the United States, Marisol and her daughter
Jennifer became part of the phenomenon known as the “border
surge” that occurred along the southwestern border beginning in
late 2013. Comprised of unaccompanied children and “family
units”192—primarily mothers and their children—mostly from
Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador, these individuals sought
to escape increased lawlessness in their homelands. The root
causes of this migration have been variably identified as
domestic abuse,193 gang violence,194 and political and social
instability.195 The term “surge” is an apt descriptor, as in fiscal
year 2014, the number of family unit apprehensions nearly
quadrupled.196
To address this influx, the federal government reversed its
policy on family detention and opened new facilities to
incarcerate these vulnerable women and children in New Mexico
and Texas. The turnabout was surprising, as just five years
earlier, the Obama Administration announced its decision to
discontinue the practice of detaining families and shut down the
notorious T. Don Hutto facility.197 Regarding the newly opened
192
CBP defines a “family unit” as representing “individuals—either a child
under 18 years old, parent or legal guardian—apprehended with a family member by
the U.S. Border Patrol.” United States Border Patrol Southwest Family Unit Subject
and Unaccompanied Alien Children Apprehensions Fiscal Year 2016, U.S. CUSTOMS
& BORDER PROT. (Oct. 18, 2016), http://cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/southwest-border-un
accompanied-children/fy-2016.
193
Mónica Ramírez & Anne K. Ream, Migrant Children Are Fleeing a Region
Rife with Sexual Violence, NEW REPUBLIC (July 23, 2014), https://newrepublic.com/
article/118820/sexual-violence-major-cause-immigration-us.
194
No Childhood Here: Why Central American Children Are Fleeing Their
Homes, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (July 1, 2014), https://www.americanimmigration
council.org/research/no-childhood-here-why-central-american-children-are-fleeingtheir-homes.
195
Id.
196
Southwest Border Unaccompanied Alien Children FY 2014, U.S. CUSTOMS &
BORDER PROT. (Nov. 24, 2015), http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/southwest-bor
der-unaccompanied-children/fy-2014.
197
2009 Immigration Detention Reforms, IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T (Dec. 12,
2011), https://www.ice.gov/factsheets/2009detention-reform.
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facilities, the Secretary of Homeland Security acknowledged that
the change in policy was part of an aggressive deterrence
strategy designed to create such inhospitable conditions that
others would be dissuaded from following. At the inauguration of
the 400-bed detention facility in Dilley, Texas, DHS Secretary
Jeh Johnson warned families without legal papers considering
coming to the United States that “[i]t will now be more likely
that you will be detained and sent back.”198
As part of the general deterrence effort, advocates alleged
that ICE officials were instructed to enforce a blanket no-release
policy even though the families had passed credible fear
screenings.199 The no-release policy represented a significant
departure from the traditional process whereby the ICE
generally did not detain families found to have a credible fear of
persecution; rather, after an individualized assessment of
primarily two factors—their flight risk and danger to the
community—the majority of these families were routinely either
set free on bond or on their own recognizance.200 In early 2015,
the general deterrence policy was litigated in R.I.L-R. v. Johnson.
The District Court for the District of Columbia issued a
preliminary injunction halting the DHS’s newly formulated
policy. The court found that the deterrence of mass migration as
a factor in custody determinations “is likely unlawful, and that
the policy causes irreparable harm.”201 Quoting Zadvydas, the
court noted that “[t]he Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized
that ‘[f]reedom from imprisonment—from government custody,
detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart
of the liberty that [the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process] Clause
protects.’ ”202
Soon after the issuance of the preliminary
injunction, DHS revised its policy such that it was ostensibly
more consistent with long-standing practice.
The policy

198
Julia Preston, Detention Center Presented as Deterrent to Border Crossings,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/16/us/homeland-secur
ity-chief-opens-largest-immigration-detention-center-in-us.html.
199
R.I.L-R v. Johnson, 80 F. Supp. 3d 164, 174 (D.D.C. 2015).
200
Id. at 174–75.
201
Id. at 191.
202
Id. at 187 (quoting Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001)) (second
alteration in original).
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announcement indicated that ICE would “discontinue invoking
general deterrence as a factor in custody determinations in all
cases involving families.”203
Meanwhile, conditions in the detention facilities in Artesia,
New Mexico, Dilley, Texas, and Karnes, Texas were deplorable.
A report issued by the United States Commission on Civil Rights,
a bipartisan agency established by Congress, cited frequent
claims of sexual abuse upon detainees in ICE custody, coercive
staff threats of physical harm, and separation of children from
mothers who reported the dismal facility conditions, which
included spoiled food, undrinkable water, and inadequate access
to medical care. 204 A study by the Organization of American
States found similar complaints and noted “inadequate and
disproportionately restrictive conditions, akin to a penal
incarceration center.”205 These conditions were reminiscent of
the offenses that led to the shuttering of the infamous T. Don
Hutto facility in 2009.206
In addition to serving to deter other potential migrants, the
newly revived detention policy also put pressure on the
incarcerated women and children, some of whom had been jailed
for months on end, to abandon their cases. However, most
women and children chose, like Marisol and Jennifer, to remain
incarcerated rather than return to the persecution they had fled.
After the issuance of the preliminary injunction in R.I.L-R and
DHS’s subsequent abandonment of its no-release policy, detained
families were finally given the opportunity to have their day in
court to argue for their release from custodial detention.
Through the efforts of pro bono networks, such as the AILA-

203
ICE Announces Enhanced Oversight for Family Residential Centers, IMMGR.
& CUSTOMS ENF’T (May 13, 2015), https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/ice-announcesenhanced-oversight-family-residential-centers.
204
U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, WITH LIBERTY AND JUSTICE FOR ALL: THE
STATE OF CIVIL RIGHTS AT U.S. IMMIGRATION DETENTION FACILITIES 124–25 (2015),
http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/Statutory_Enforcement_Report2015.pdf.
205
ORG. OF AM. STATES, REFUGEES AND MIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES:
FAMILIES AND UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN 75–76 (2015), http://www.oas.org/en/iach
r/reports/pdfs/Refugees-Migrants-US.pdf.
206
Lawsuits Ask That Children and Their Families Be Released From Texas
Facility Under Appropriate and Humane Supervision, ACLU (Mar. 6, 2007), https://
www.aclu.org/news/aclu-challenges-illegal-detention-immigrant-children-held-prison
-conditions.
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CARA Pro Bono Defense Project, many families were represented
at bond hearings.
However, the terms of the pro bono
representation were often limited to only the bond hearing.207
Consequently, once set free on bond or on their own
recognizance,
many
families
still
faced
the
nearly
insurmountable task of arguing their merit cases pro se.
B.

Detained Children

As a result of the current policy of family detention,
hundreds of children are currently detained with their mothers
in facilities located primarily in the Southwest. The Supreme
Court visited the issue of additional due process safeguards to be
afforded to juveniles in In re Gault.208 The Court held that
minors in delinquency proceedings are entitled by the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to a number of
procedural safeguards, including the right to appointed counsel.
Others have argued that Turner, when applied in conjunction
with Gault, provides the basis for the right to appointed counsel
in removal proceedings.209 This Article takes the approach of
emphasizing the out-sized influences of the Turner limiting
conditions in making the case for the appointment of counsel for
detained children.
The two Turner conditions interact to amplify the due
process shortcomings for detained minors. As with the plaintiff
Franco-Gonzalez, detained minors operate under an incapacity.
Their youth prevents them from fully appreciating the nature of
the removal proceedings and inhibits their ability to adequately
defend themselves in immigration court. Without the assistance
of effective counsel, the imbalance of power created by the
asymmetry in representation is an insurmountable obstacle to a
fundamentally fair proceeding. The injustice contemplated in
Turner is an always-binding limitation in the case of
207
In recognition of the frequency with which representation is limited to only
custody or bond proceedings, EOIR issued a new rule in late 2015 that for the first
time allowed the entry of an appearance by an attorney or accredited representative
before the Immigration Court for this limited purpose only. Permitting such
separate appearances was designed to encourage legal representation of individuals
who would otherwise appear pro se at their custody and bond proceedings. Separate
Representation for Custody and Bond Proceedings, 80 Fed. Reg. 59500 (Oct. 1, 2015)
(codified at 8 C.F.R. § 1003.17 (2017)).
208
387 U.S. 1, 4 (1967).
209
See Devins, supra note 7, at 910.
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unaccompanied children since, under the reasoning of Gagnon
and Turner, a legal contest between a child and an adult can
hardly be viewed as “fundamentally fair.” Moreover, while the
mental disability attributed to the Franco-Gonzalez plaintiffs
could arguably be challenged, the nature of the incapacity of the
unaccompanied minors is unequivocal. Nor could this incapacity
be overcome by treatment or medication.
The injustice that arises from the lack of representation for
detained children is intertwined with the second Turner limiting
condition—the complexity of immigration law—as applied to
minors. There exists certain forms of relief from removal for
minors that are uniquely complex.
One of these, Special
Immigrant Juvenile Status (“SIJS”), grants legal status to
qualifying minors who have been deemed abused, abandoned or
neglected by one or both parents.210 By some estimates, as many
as twenty-three percent of undocumented minors have a
colorable claim for SIJS.211 A distinguishing feature of SIJS is
that a minor who successfully petitions for this form of relief is
precluded by statute from filing any immigrant petition for either
parent. Thus, a significant conflict of interest is embedded
within SIJS: a detained mother may be reluctant to pursue this
form of relief for her child since the mother would, if the petition
was successful, thereby be cut off from any derivative claim of
relief. It would be in the mother’s self-interest to resist filing an
SIJS claim for her child, but rather to pursue an asylum claim
which would in most circumstances allow the mother to benefit
from derivative status.
The resulting conflict of interest raises the possibility that a
detained child would elect, on his or her own, to pursue an SIJS
claim. This form of relief first requires a predicate special
findings order of dependency by a state juvenile court. For the
unrepresented minor, this means navigating the state court
proceedings where often no interpreter services are available.
210
See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(4) (2012) (allocating a percentage of immigrant visas
to individuals considered “special immigrants”); see also 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(27)(J)
(West 2014) (defining “Special Immigrant Juveniles”).
211
Olga Byrne & Elise Miller, The Flow of Unaccompanied Children Through
the Immigration System, VERA INST. OF JUST. 25 (Mar. 2012), https://storage.googlea
pis.com/vera-web-assets/downloads/Publications/the-flow-of-unaccompaniedchildren-through-the-immigration-system-a-resource-for-practitioners-policymakers-and-researchers/legacy_downloads/the-flow-of-unaccompanied-childrenthrough-the-immigration-system.pdf.
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The jurisdictional grounds for obtaining the predicate order are
varied and could require, depending on the individual state, a
petition for legal guardianship, child custody, juvenile
delinquency proceedings, or child dependency proceedings.212 In
some jurisdictions, the state court remains unfamiliar with or
confused about its ability to grant special findings orders, posing
yet another hurdle for the unrepresented minor.213
Once having navigated the state juvenile court system, the
unrepresented minor seeking SIJS relief would next need to
follow a set of adjudication procedures involving the immigration
court and USCIS.
The minor would appear before an
immigration judge to seek a continuance while a petition for SIJS
is filed with USCIS. If USCIS approves the petition, the minor
would return to immigration court to file an adjustment of status
application with the immigration judge. The judge could choose
to terminate the removal proceedings upon USCIS’s approval of
the petition, but he has the option to hold a full merits hearing
on the application.
Thus, in order to prevail in a claim for SIJS relief from
removal, a minor must appear in two judicial settings—juvenile
court and immigration court—in addition to filing a petition with
USCIS. The complexity of the process for SIJS relief, coupled
with the crippling effect of a lack of representation, gives added
weight to the limiting Turner conditions.
C.

Asylum Applicants

The majority of women and children detained as part of the
border surge strategy have filed applications for asylum.
Undocumented persons in removal proceedings who raise an
asylum defense have an elevated entitlement to appointed
counsel under both the first factor of the Mathews test—the
private interest at stake—and the second Turner factor—the
complexity of the body of law.
By definition, asylees face the risk of torture, persecution, or
death if they are returned to their home countries. Thus, the
relative importance of Plasencia’s weighty private interest is
212
Annie Chen, An Urgent Need: Unaccompanied Children and Access to
Counsel in Immigration Proceedings, ABA 4 (July 14, 2014), http://apps.american
bar.org/litigation/committees/childrights/content/articles/summer2014-0714-urgentneed-unaccompanied-children-access-counsel-immigration-proceedings.html.
213
Id.
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enhanced by the serious risk of harm that may befall
unsuccessful asylum applicants who are removed.214
To
illustrate, consider the case of Constantino Morales, a former
police officer in Mexico who publicly stood up against drug
trafficking, was denied asylum in the United States, and was
shot to death within six months of being returned to Mexico.215 It
is difficult to quantify the total number of unsuccessful asylum
applicants who subsequently succumb to the persecution that
initially caused them to flee since no United States government
agency tracks the status of rejected asylum applicants after their
removal.
However, recent research compiled from local
newspaper reports in Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador
suggests that at least eighty-three deportees from the United
States have been murdered upon their return to Central America
since January 2014.216
Moreover, keeping in mind the individuated nature of
procedural due process, the right to appointed counsel is even
stronger for those asylum applicants who have passed their
credible fear interview, the first threshold test of a successful
asylum claim. The claims of these individuals have been
screened by a trained asylum officer who has concluded that
there exists “a significant possibility . . . that the alien could
establish eligibility for asylum under [§] 1158 [of the INA].”217
The second Turner factor—the complexity of the body of law
at issue—is implicated in the case of asylum seekers, in part,
because of the “unequivocal chasm”218 in the consistency of
certain asylum adjudications.
Fundamentally inconsistent
interpretations of elemental terms create a confusing body of

214
Pitsker, supra note 6, at 188 (noting that “[t]he private interest in avoiding
the general hardship of deportation is magnified exponentially in the case of an
asylum seeker, who may face persecution, torture, or death if returned to his
country”).
215
MacKenzie Elmer, Brother of Slain Deported Man: ‘We Fought to Keep Him
Here,’ DES MOINES REG. (Apr. 10 2015, 11:39 PM), http://www.desmoinesregister.
com/story/news/2015/04/10/constantino-morales-roque-deported-mexico-killed/25615
303.
216
Sibylla Brodzinsky & Ed Pilkington, US Government Deporting Central
American Migrants to Their Death, GUARDIAN (Oct. 12, 2015, 08:57), https://www.
theguardian.com/us-news/2015/oct/12/obama-immigration-deportations-central-amer
ica.
217
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(v) (2012).
218
Scott Rempell, Asylum Discord: Disparities in Persecution Assessments, 15
NEV. L.J. 142, 148 (2014).
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jurisprudence that only a trained advocate can decipher. For
example, a recent study of the inconsistencies in the
interpretation of the term “persecution”—the bedrock
requirement for a viable asylum claim—found:
[In the Ninth Circuit,] a one-day detention involving electric
shock compelled a finding of persecution, while [in the First
Circuit,] a ten-day detention involving electric shock did not.
Similarly, while [in the Seventh Circuit,] several weeks of
psychological suffering necessarily established persecution,
several years of even greater psychological suffering failed to
cross the persecution threshold [in the Ninth Circuit].219

In addition to inter-circuit disparities, the lack of a uniform
persecution standard has given rise to significant disparities in
intra-circuit interpretations of the term resulting in wildly
divergent grant rates by immigration judges within the same
jurisdiction.220
In light of the complexity of asylum law, where even basic
terms are unpredictably interpreted, it is no surprise that there
is a stark disparity in legal outcomes for unrepresented women
and children who were part of the 2014-2015 border surge.
“[T]he single most important factor in determining [legal]
outcomes is whether or not these individuals are represented in
their court proceedings.”221 Recent data suggests that detained
women and children almost never prevail if they appear without
representation—only 2.3% were granted asylum; however,
women with children who appeared with representation
benefitted from a 32.9% success rate, representing a more than
fourteen-fold increase in the likelihood that they would be
permitted to stay.222
Further, several empirical studies have concluded that
evidence of credible fear of persecution and human rights
conditions in the homeland country are not necessarily the most
important factors assessed in an asylum claim. Rather, such
unrelated factors as the judge’s gender and prior work
experience, as well as the asylum-applicant’s gender, educational

219

Id. (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 192.
221
Representation Makes Fourteen-Fold Difference in Outcome: Immigration
Court “Women with Children” Cases, TRAC IMMIGR. (July 15, 2015), http://trac.syr.
edu/immigration/reports/396.
222
Id.
220
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level, and religion have a significant effect on outcomes.223 The
resulting lack of consistent asylum adjudications further
complicates an already complex body of law and underscores the
heightened need for appointed counsel for indigent asylum
applicants facing removal.
Another dimension to the asylum application process that
creates an urgent need for appointed counsel is the statutory
provision, which requires that any asylum claim must be brought
within one year of the noncitizen’s entry into the United
States.224 Asylum claims made after the one-year deadline are
time barred unless the noncitizen demonstrates “either the
existence of changed circumstances which materially affect
eligibility for asylum or extraordinary circumstances relating to
the delay in filing a[] [timely] application.”225 Moreover, a
subsequent asylum application that presents a previously
unraised basis for relief will be deemed to be a new application.226
In the absence of changed or extraordinary circumstances, the
filing date of the subsequent asylum application will control for
the purposes of determining whether the one-year time bar
applies.227 While this Article does not argue for the appointment
of counsel before any asylum claim is filed, the assistance of
counsel is required to overcome the one-year time bar in those
situations after changed or extraordinary circumstances have
occurred.
An obvious peril in the provision of counsel to detained
families seeking asylum is that the policy would prove to be
perfunctory or token.
Attorneys representing women and
children detained at the Dilley and Karnes facilities have
complained that ICE has prevented them from accompanying
their clients to compulsory meetings where the clients are forced
to make decisions and potentially forfeit rights without
counsel.228 Attorneys have also on occasion been barred from

223
Linda Camp Keith & Jennifer S. Holmes, A Rare Examination of Typically
Unobservable Factors in US Asylum Decisions, 22 J. REFUGEE STUD. 224, 228, 240
(2009).
224
8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B) (2012).
225
§ 1158(a)(2)(D).
226
M-A-F-, 26 I & N Dec. 651, 665 (B.I.A. 2015).
227
Id. at 656–57.
228
Olga Byrne & Eleanor Acer, Family Detention: Still Happening, Still
Damaging, HUM. RTS. FIRST 3–4 (Oct. 20, 2015), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/
sites/default/files/HRF-family-detention-still-happening.pdf.
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even entering the facilities to serve their clients.229 Other
troubling reports have highlighted DHS’s propensity to transfer
represented mothers and children away from counsel, sometimes
without any or meaningful notice, and disregarding pending or
scheduled requests for reconsideration and other ongoing legal
processes.230 A successful policy requiring the appointment of
counsel for detained women and children would require the
cessation of governmental procedures that impede effective
representation.
CONCLUSION
The noble intent underpinning Gideon’s promise has not
been expanded to encompass immigration proceedings. There
exists no recognized categorical right to appointed counsel for
noncitizens appearing in immigration court, with the limited
exception carved out in the landmark Franco-Gonzalez case. The
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 provided the basis for the FrancoGonzalez order that counsel be appointed for noncitizens with
mental disabilities who are facing removal. In an act of
constitutional avoidance, the court did not reach the plaintiffs’
constitutional claim.
This Article demonstrates that had the Franco-Gonzalez
court engaged in the constitutional inquiry, the same categorical
right to appointed counsel would have resulted under an analysis
that incorporates recent developments in due process
jurisprudence. The two conditions that limited the Turner
holding—asymmetrical legal representation and complexity of
the law at issue—are ever present in removal proceedings. The
extraordinary hardship imposed by banishment inexorably leads
to the conclusion that appointed counsel is required to ensure
procedural due process. For detained women and children
fleeing persecution in their homeland the stakes are even higher:
removal may amount to a death sentence. While the costs
associated with providing counsel are not insubstantial, they are
mitigated by lowered detention and administrative costs. In the
final analysis, however, financial considerations should not be
229
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Letter from Am. Immigration Lawyers Ass’n et al., to Leon Rodriguez, Dir.,
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Servs., and Sarah Saldana, Dir., Immigration and
Customs Enf’t (Dec. 24, 2015), http://www.aila.org/advo-media/aila-correspondence/
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the determining factor.
Constitutional rights cannot be
translated into common currency. Assuring the fundamental
fairness of immigration proceedings by appointing counsel to the
unrepresented would provide new breath to Gideon’s clarion call
for justice.

